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Abstract
Data poisoning attacks compromise the integrity of machine-learning models by
introducing malicious training samples to influence the results during test time. In
this work, we investigate backdoor data poisoning attack on deep neural networks
(DNNs) by inserting a backdoor pattern in the training images. The resulting at-
tack will misclassify poisoned test samples while maintaining high accuracies for
the clean test-set. We present two approaches for detection of such poisoned sam-
ples by quantifying the uncertainty estimates associated with the trained models.
In the first approach, we model the outputs of the various layers (deep features)
with parametric probability distributions learnt from the clean held-out dataset. At
inference, the likelihoods of deep features w.r.t these distributions are calculated
to derive uncertainty estimates. In the second approach, we use Bayesian deep
neural networks trained with mean-field variational inference to estimate model
uncertainty associated with the predictions. The uncertainty estimates from these
methods are used to discriminate clean from the poisoned samples.
1. Introduction
Data poisoning attacks are security threats introduced in machine learning models during the train-
ing phase. Deep neural networks (DNNs) require a large amount of training data and compute
resources to model complex tasks. In many practical scenarios, it is required to crowd-source the
data collection or outsource the model training to external entities. This poses real security chal-
lenges, which can result in compromised machine learning systems. Poisoning attacks have been
studied in the context of image classification and computer vision [15, 16, 6], denial of service [14],
sentiment analysis [12] and malware detection [2, 18]. Defensive strategies against data poisoning
mostly revolve around anomaly detection (see [13, 3] and references therein), though other methods
exist [5].
In this paper, we consider a type of causative attack reported in [6] where the attacker introduces
backdoor pattern in the training dataset (poisoned samples) with the intent to compromise trained
model. The resulting model continues to have high accuracy on a held-out clean test-set, and is hence
not detectable by such means. This attack scenario is applicable for the trained model obtained from
unknown entity or for the model training performed from crowd-sourced data.
Contributions: This paper proposes two promising strategies against data poisoning attacks: a)
In the first approach, we model the deep features of a DNN using parametric probability density
functions and statistically measure input uncertainty to detect the poisoning attack. b) In the second
approach, we use model uncertainty obtained from Bayesian deep neural networks to detect the
poisoning attack. Our results show these strategies are effective in detecting data poisoning attacks.
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2. Problem Statement and Approach
The threat model assumed here is the one presented by Gu et al. [6]. Per this model, the attacker
introduces backdoor samples into the training data, Dtrain, in such a manner that the accuracy
of the resulting trained model measured on a held-out validation set does not reduce relative to
that of an honestly trained model. Further, for inputs containing a backdoor trigger, the output
predictions will be different from those of the honestly trained model. We propose, in this work,
two probabilistic methods to derive uncertainty estimates from the compromised deep-network such
that lower uncertainty values are obtained for clean samples while higher values are obtained for
backdoored or poisoned samples, thereby providing a mechanism to flag such backdoored inputs as
anomalous or abnormal during inference. These methods are as follows:
Probabilistic modeling of deep features (DeepFeatures): Suppose we have a deep network
trained to recognize samples from N classes, {Ck}, k = 1, . . . , N . Let fi(x) denote the output
at the ith layer of the network. Our approach consists of fitting class-conditional probability distri-
butions to the features of a DNN, once training is completed. By fitting distributions to the deep
features induced by training samples, we are effectively defining a generative model over the deep
feature space. At test time, the log-likelihood scores of the features of a test sample are calculated
with respect to these distributions. Details of the approach can be found in [1]. We show that these
scores can be used to discriminate clean samples (which should have high likelihood) from poisoned
samples (which should have low likelihood).
Bayesian Neural Networks (BNN): We use mean-field variational inference (MFVI) to learn the
posterior over weights, and train the model by specifying the prior and approximate posterior as
proposed by Krishnan et al. [9] for efficient and scalable MFVI. We use model uncertainty to distin-
guish between clean and poison samples. We measure the model uncertainty using Bayesian active
learning by disagreement (BALD) [8], which quantifies mutual information between parameter pos-
terior distribution and predictive distribution.
3. Experiments and Results
Experimental Setup: We use MNIST [11] and CIFAR10 [10] datasets to study the backdoor data
poisoning attack on image classification task. The training set,Dtrain, contains all the original clean
samples,Dcleantrain , along with additional backdoored (BD) training samples,D
BD
train, i.e
Dtrain = D
clean
train ∪D
BD
train
We also have a clean held-out validation set,Dcleanval , from which we generate additional backdoored
samples, DBDval , which will used to measure the effectiveness of the attack and that of our proposed
defense. The attack patterns used are the same as those in [6], in which a four-pixel backdoor pattern
is used for MNIST and a 4x4 square pattern is used for CIFAR. For both the datasets, a poisoned
sample class label is reassigned to the next class (in a circular count). We study the effect of varying
the percentage of poisoned samples in Dtrain. We use ResNet-20 [7] architecture for experiments
with CIFAR10 dataset, and a simple convolutional neural network (SCNN) architecture consisting
of two convolutional layers followed by two dense layers for experiments with MNIST dataset.
In the DeepFeatures (DF) approach, DNN models are trained on the Dtrain training set and the
parameters of fitted density function are estimated from half of the Dcleanval held-out set (since we
assume no access to the training data). The performance is measured using the remaining half of
Dcleanval (i.e samples not used for fitting the distribution) as well as D
BD
val .
In the Bayesian neural networks (BNN) approach, we approximate the weight posteriori in varia-
tional layers with mean-field Gaussian distribution using Flipout [17]. The weight prior and approx-
imate posterior for MFVI are specified based on the weights obtained through maximum likelihood
estimation from Dtrain using the efficient training approach presented in [9]. During inference
phase, predictive distributions are obtained by performing multiple stochastic forward passes over
the network while sampling from posterior distribution of the weights (40 Monte Carlo samples in
our experiments). We evaluate the model uncertainty with Bayesian active learning by disagreement
(BALD) [8] (Equation 2) forDBDval andD
BD
train test sets.
Results: We demonstrate the effectiveness of poisoning attacks on DNNs and discuss the proposed
defense mechanisms against these attacks. The experiments included different percentages of back-
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% of backdoor samples 0 10 20 30 40 50
MNIST
Clean
DNN 99.21 99.28 99.26 99.35 99.32 99.24
DF - 99.04 98.74 98.94 99.04 98.97
BNN - 99.56 99.64 99.56 99.51 99.5
Poisoned
DNN - 98.78 98.87 99.16 99.12 99.29
DF - 35.54 17.55 11.87 7.32 20.54
BNN - 99.54 99.44 99.5 99.59 99.43
CIFAR10
Clean
DNN 88.9 88.36 88.23 87.39 87.87 88.74
DF - 88.16 88.32 88.20 88.95 88.26
BNN - 89.48 89.63 89.80 90.00 90.05
Poisoned
DNN - 84.08 81.95 86.4 86.94 88.29
DF - 69.66 64.37 75.00 75.86 80.52
BNN - 88.30 88.96 88.82 90.02 90.05
Table 1: Classification accuracies for MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets on Clean (held-out) and Poisoned (back-
door) samples. The backdoor attack is successful in compromising the DNN model by providing similar accu-
racies for clean and poisoned test samples. DF method is successful in dropping the classification accuracy of
the poisoned data flagging a compromised model. BNN is not effective in modeling this attack as it fits well
with training distribution, which includes both clean and poisoned samples.
% of backdoor samples 10 20 30 40 50
MNIST
DNN 83.18 81.58 68.30 54.31 53.14
DF 99.43 99.70 99.91 99.96 99.96
BNN 97.47 86.24 72.90 58.46 46.46
CIFAR10
DNN 40.62 64.16 36.39 38.68 41.99
DF 91.87 74.58 90.94 91.81 85.17
BNN 92.24 82.03 70.95 58.89 49.22
Table 2: AUPR scores for the DNN, DF and BNNmodels onMNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. AUPR scores are
calculated using binary classification of clean and poisoned samples. DF and BNN methods show significantly
higher scores than the deterministic DNN models.
door samples included in the training set. In Table 1, DNN accuracies are reported for both clean
and poisoned datasets. Note that for a poisoned sample, the classification outcome is considered
‘correct’ if it matches the target poisoned label, not the original clean label. Thus, high accuracy on
the poisoned dataset indicates that the poisoning attack (with backdoor patterns) has been successful
in making the network misclassify the poisoned set while maintaining high accuracy for the clean
set.
For the DeepFeatures (DF) method, if the log-likelihood scores are used to perform classification
instead of the softmax scores, the accuracies for the poisoned set are significantly lower than those
for the clean set. This indicates that the poisoned samples are not being misclassified as intended by
the attacker which suggests that the deep-features themselves are remaining resilient to the poisoning
attacks tested here.
In the case of Bayesian neural networks (BNN) with MFVI, the accuracies for both the clean and
poisoned samples are high indicating the model is not able to differentiate poisoned and the clean
datasets. These results are expected since the model is trained on Dtrain set resulting in model
learning the distribution of poisoned samples as well. In the case DFmethod, since the distribution of
clean held-out test set are used to fit the distribution, it has an anchor point to differentiate clean from
the poisoned samples. In order for BNN to be able to detect the data poisoning attacks, they need to
be trained on the held-out clean training set, so that the model can differentiate the distributions of
clean and poisoned samples.
In the next set of experiments, we investigate the effectiveness of using the uncertainty methods
from DF and BNN methods to distinguish between clean and poisoned samples. The task is set-up
as a binary classification task whose performance is evaluated using the precision-recall curve and
the area under it (AUPR). In Table 2, we present the AUPR values for both DF and BNN methods.
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Both DF and BNN methods provide better AUPR values than the deterministic DNN mdoel. BNN
performs better at lower percentage of backdoor samples, but with more poisoned samples the BNN
model learns the poisoned data distribution resulting in lower AUPR for data poisoning detection.
4. Discussion
The success of the data poisoning attack with simple backdoor patterns (hardly noticeable) show
the real threat associated with these attacks on the machine learning models. The two approaches
presented here as defense mechanism have the potential to be able to detect the backdoor data poi-
soning attacks by leveraging uncertainty estimates. Since the uncertainty measures obtained from
these two methods are complementary, we will explore ways to combine these methods to model
distribution over features and distribution over weights as part of our future work. We presented a
potential research thread for these type of poisoning attacks to the research community at large, and
we will continue to further investigate these attacks in light of these studies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Uncertainty Quantification
Given training dataset D = {x, y} with inputs x = {x1, ..., xN} and their corresponding outputs
y = {y1, ..., yN}, predictive distribution is obtained through multiple stochastic forward passes
through the network while sampling from the posterior of weights p(w |D) through Monte Carlo
estimators. Equation 1 shows the predictive distribution of the output y∗ given new input x∗:
p(y∗|x∗, D) =
∫
p(y∗|x∗, w) p(w |D)dw
p(y∗|x∗, D) ≈
1
T
T∑
i=1
p(y∗|x∗, wi) , wi ∼ p(w |D)
(1)
where, T is number of Monte Carlo samples.
We estimate the model uncertainty in Bayesian deep neural network using Bayesian active learning
by disagreement (BALD) [8], which quantifies mutual information between parameter posterior
distribution and predictive distribution.
BALD := H(y∗|x∗, D)− Ep(w|D)[H(y
∗|x∗, w)] (2)
where H(y∗|x∗, D) is the predictive entropy as shown in Equation 3. Predictive entropy captures a
combination of input uncertainty and model uncertainty [4].
H(y∗|x∗, D) := −
K−1∑
i=0
piµ ∗ log piµ (3)
where piµ is predictive mean probability of i
th class from T Monte Carlo samples, and K is total
number of output classes.
A.2 Additional Results
5
% of backdoor samples 10 20 30 40 50
MNIST
DNN 83.60 83.31 73.41 57.65 51.66
DF 99.67 99.83 99.96 99.98 99.98
BNN 83.22 69.94 61.91 55.75 51.55
CIFAR10
DNN 53.95 71.24 51.09 51.02 55.09
DF 95.75 85.09 95.57 95.78 91.96
BNN 58.64 55.23 53.03 50.34 50.13
Table 3: AUROC scores for the DNN, DF and BNN models on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. AUROC
scores are obtained from the binary classification of clean and poisoned datasets.
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